Description

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In nine short days, Taliban forces destroyed two decades of American armed statebuilding in Afghanistan. This was no isolated failure. Over the last century, almost every attempt to intervene militarily to prop up or reconstruct an allied state has seen similar dismal outcomes. Why? This book answers that fundamental question.

By exploring the factors that hindered success in Afghanistan, Adam Wunische identifies forces common to other unsuccessful U.S. armed statebuilding missions, from Vietnam to Syria, Haiti to Iraq. These forces, he argues, inherently favor insurgencies, forfeit sustainability for quick results, and create dependencies and corruption - all of which undermine the goal of building a state that can stand on its own. Not only that, but most of these forces are inescapable and uncontrollable. This means any future attempts at armed statebuilding will likely also be unwinnable, with costs and consequences far outpacing America's interests and benefits.

Faced with a future likely dominated by proxy wars, Wunische offers a novel way forward to prevent the U.S. from chasing new wars that it is destined to lose.

About the Author

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Adam Wunische is a senior analyst and researcher working on military, intelligence, and security issues. Previously, he was a military analyst and analytic methodologist with the CIA covering security issues in Afghanistan and South Asia. He is also a lecturer at George Washington University, teaching classes on military affairs, terrorism and political violence, and analytic research methods. Adam has held a number of positions throughout the policy and analysis fields, including research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Adam was a sergeant serving in US Army intelligence from 2005 to 2010, completing two deployments to Afghanistan in support of the 3rd Special Forces Group.